planification meaning
Therefore, the models developed analyze the nature of the contract allowing the shareholder to effectively incentivize a risk-averse (Chen and Chu, 2005) or risk-neutral (Crocker and Slemrod, 2004) manager. – the risk corresponding here to the risk of detection and sanction of fraud – resorting to tax evasion in order to increase the after-tax income of the company, even though there is an asymmetry of information in favor of the manager,planification fiscale the latter being supposed to master the information relating to what it is legally possible to do to reduce the declared income – which allows him to make the shareholders believe, if necessary, that he is fraudulent when such is not the case in reality. Finally, Crocker and Slemrod (2004) assume that shareholders cannot resort to an explicit clause in the manager's contract forcing him to defraud when it could not be applied by a court given its illegal nature; this may lead us to suppose that, 8These works – essentially theoretical – therefore perceive the principal-agent problem as residing in an insufficient willingness of the manager to provide an “effort” in order to reduce the tax burden – whether it is a question of tax evasion, as in the examples which just mentioned, or more simply tax planning; the optimal contract would therefore be intended to counterbalance a trend synonymous with lower gains for shareholders. However, some empirical studies, also within the framework of agency theory, suggest that shareholders do not seek to induce managers to resort to tax planning but, conversely, The aforementioned studies associate, in fact, tax planning and embezzlement of profits by managers and even, sometimes, by dominant shareholders. By way of illustration, considering the case of the Tyco group, whose general manager and chief financial officer, Denis Kozlowski and Mark Swartz, were convicted in 2005 for fraud, falsification of documents and aggravated theft in particular, Desai (2005) suggests that the complexity of tax planning activities creates a “darkness” that gives management latitude to engage in transactions for its own benefit.